My dissertation examines the extent to which the bicameralism influences policy outcomes.  In the case of the United States, I ask how the presence of the Senate institution moderates bills passed by the U.S. House?  Specifically, I show how developments in the rules within each chamber contribute to how policies are considered and constrain how proposals are changed during the legislative process. 

To measure how much policy outcomes change I will compare the proposed spending levels from the House, Senate and final versions of regular appropriation bills.  The goal is to make use of the constitutional requirements of Article 1 Section 7 and the path dependence of allowing the U.S. House to interpret Article 1 Section 9 as a justification to be the first actor to create a controlled test of this process from 1880 to 1984.

Cartoon to the Left:

Berryman, Clifford K. "Hepburn Rate Bill."  Washington Post, printed May 15, 1906. 

Source: US Senate Collection, Center for Legislative Archives